The revamped library at AMK Hub will open on 20 Nov, while Queenstown Library will reopen only in late 2028.   👉 https://mustsharenews.com/ang-mo-kio-library/   @mustsharenews   Here are the full details regarding the major National Library Board (NLB) updates for the Ang Mo Kio and Queenstown public libraries:   ### 1. Ang Mo Kio Public Library:   Relocation to AMK Hub The Ang Mo Kio Library is moving from its standalone building to a more central, accessible location inside AMK Hub.    * **Closing Date (Current Site):** The final day of operations at 4300 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6 is **July 31, 2026**.    * **Opening Date (New Site):** The relocated library will officially open at AMK Hub (Level 4, taking over the space formerly occupied by the cinema) on **November 20, 2026**.    * **What to Expect:** The new library promises seamless public transport connectivity (MRT and bus interchange). Its interior design is inspired by the neighborhood's iconic landmarks and local green spaces, featuring tall bookshelves alongside new immersive and interactive learning spaces.    * **Interim Services:** From August until October 29, 2026, patrons can use a temporary **Sit-n-Read Node** and a self-service **Browse-n-Borrow kiosk** on Level 4 of AMK Hub (just outside the construction barriers). Alternatively, you can head to nearby branches in Bishan, Yishun, or Toa Payoh.    * **Future of the Old Building:** The vacant site on Avenue 6 will eventually be redeveloped into a healthcare facility to complement the adjacent Ang Mo Kio Polyclinic.   ### 2. Queenstown Public Library: Extensive Heritage Revamp As Singapore's oldest public library (first opened in 1970 by the late Mr. Lee Kuan Yew), Queenstown Library is getting a deep structural makeover.    * **Closing Date:** The library at 53 Margaret Drive will temporarily shut its doors starting **August 31, 2026**.    * **Reopening Date:** It is projected to reopen in **late 2028**.    * **Why it's taking longer:** The library was gazetted for conservation by the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) in 2013. Because it is a protected heritage site, the upcoming closure follows extensive preparatory work to ensure its **iconic exterior facade is carefully preserved** while the interior is structurally overhauled.    * **The New Design:** The revamped layout will blend modern tech and sustainability features while weaving the rich history of the Queenstown community directly into its new design, program spaces, and local herita ge showcases.

🧑‍💻 2 self-radicalised S’porean men have been issued orders under the Internal Security Act (ISA).   1 of them took photos of his phone showing an extremist e-publication against the backdrop of MBS, & posted them publicly as a pledge of allegiance to an extremist group.   ➡️ https://bit.ly/4xMFwyU   Follow us @mothershipsg     **Full details on the case (as of June 24, 2026):**   Two self-radicalised Singaporean men were issued orders under the **Internal Security Act (ISA)** in March 2026 by the Internal Security Department (ISD). Their radicalisation was triggered by the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   ### 1. Tarmizi bin Mohd Taha, 30 (Customer service officer) - **Order**: Order of Detention (OD) — the more serious measure, indicating he posed an imminent security threat. - **Background and radicalisation**:   - Interest began after Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023 attacks on Israel. He joined social media channels, consumed Hamas propaganda, and viewed the group as defenders of Palestinians.   - By 2024, he justified armed violence against those he saw as oppressors of Palestinians.   - He posted pro-Hamas content online.   - Connected with an online contact claiming to be a Hamas member, who offered help to travel to Palestinian territories to join them.   - In August 2025, a video of a Palestinian being killed re-triggered his intent. He lacked funds to travel but expressed willingness to carry out attacks in Singapore or against Israel if instructed by Hamas.   - Planned to use his administrative/logistics skills (including NS experience as a logistics assistant in the Singapore Police Force) to support Hamas, aspiring to "martyrdom."   ### 2. Cyrus Dzulqarnain Al-Shahriar, 19 (Student) - **Order**: Restriction Order (RO) — allows monitoring and rehabilitation; less restrictive than detention but still imposes limits (e.g., no changing residence/job, no overseas travel without approval, no internet/social media access without permission, no public statements, etc.). - **Background and radicalisation** (involved "Composite Violent Extremism" or CoVE — mixing multiple, sometimes conflicting ideologies, sometimes called "salad bar" extremism):   - Started in 2022 exploring Islam online but also exposed to anti-Western and anti-LGBTQ content. Posted inciting violence against the LGBTQ community.   - Post-Oct. 7, 2023: Supported Hamas' violent actions (including against civilians) as jihad; considered traveling to Gaza.   - Mid-2024 onward: Joined a niche Islamist extremist group with violent accelerationist views (aiming to create chaos to establish Islam as the leading global force, viewing Singapore and other first-world countries as Zionist-controlled extensions of the US).   - Supported groups like Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Hamas; glorified past attacks like 9/11 and the 2002 Bali bombings.   - **Specific incident matching the post**: At a group member's request, he visited the Esplanade area twice in 2025, took photos of his phone displaying an extremist e-publication against the Marina Bay Sands (MBS) backdrop, and posted them publicly in November 2025 as a "pledge of allegiance" to the group. (Photos redacted in official releases.)   - Harassed perceived anti-Islam users online, spread fake news, and incited violence.   - Early 2025: Also explored incel ideology (influenced by Elliot Rodger), posted threats against women, and fantasised about violence against LGBTQ individuals — but these remained at the ideation stage without preparatory actions.   ### Context - These are the 7th and 8th Singaporeans dealt with under the ISA whose radicalisation was triggered or accelerated by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since its re-escalation. - Cyrus is the second known CoVE case, showing the growing mix of extremist ideologies (especially among youths) online. - ISD emphasised that while concern for the humanitarian situation is valid, extremist exploitation of conflicts will not be tolerated. They urged vigilance for warning signs like sharing extremist content, expressing support for violence/terrorists, or displaying related symbols, and to report concerns to ISD (1800-2626-473).   ### Other updates in the same ISD release - A previously detained individual (Radjev Lal Madan Lal, 33) was released on RO in April 2026. - Restriction orders for three others lapsed due to rehabilitation progress.   **Source**: Primary details from ISD via Mothership.sg article (June 24, 2026), which aligns with official statements.   This reflects Singapore's ongoing efforts to counter self-radicalisation, particularly online, linked to foreign conflicts.

**Here's an analysis using the 5 Whys technique** on why Mugentech users (like the poster) often want others to cross-post content — such as a nice Teochew video — to HardwareZone (HWZ).   ### Problem Statement Mugentech users frequently ask others to post interesting/funny/cultural content (e.g., a Teochew dialect video from TikTok) on HardwareZone forums instead of doing it themselves or just sharing it on Mugentech.   ### 5 Whys Analysis   **Why 1: Why do they want it posted on HWZ?**   Because HWZ (especially the EDMW section) has significantly higher traffic, visibility, and a larger active user base compared to Mugentech. A post there reaches far more people.   **Why 2: Why does higher traffic on HWZ matter for sharing a "very nice Teochew video"?**   Cultural/dialect content like Teochew videos performs better with a broad Singaporean audience. HWZ's established forums (active since the late 90s) attract a wide mix of users who engage with light-hearted, nostalgic, or local culture shares, leading to more views, comments, and shares.   **Why 3: Why not just post it on Mugentech or let it stay on TikTok?**   Mugentech is smaller/niche (more "mugen"/enthusiast-oriented), so content can get less engagement. TikTok is algorithm-driven and fleeting; forum crossposting gives it a more permanent home with discussion threads. Some users may face barriers (e.g., low post count, account restrictions, or preference for anonymity).   **Why 4: Why do these visibility and engagement differences exist between the forums?**   HWZ is the older, more mainstream "go-to" Singapore forum with strong brand recognition and sections like Eat-Drink-Man-Woman that thrive on casual shares. Mugentech, while freer in some ways (e.g., no Singpass for certain content), has a smaller community and different culture. HWZ still draws more eyeballs for viral/local content.   **Why 5 (Root Cause): Why does this dynamic persist in the Singapore forum ecosystem?**   Network effects and inertia — HWZ built a massive user base over decades as Singapore's primary tech/lifestyle forum. Newer or alternative forums like Mugentech struggle to match that scale, so users chase the bigger audience for maximum impact on fun/cultural shares. Moderation differences, reputation systems, and perceived "prestige" also play a role (some avoid posting on HWZ directly due to stricter rules or reports).   **Summary / Root Insight:** It's mostly about **audience size and reach**. A nice Teochew video has broader appeal on HWZ's bigger stage. If you're on Mugentech and want more eyes on it, the wish makes sense — but many hesitate to post there themselves due to account requirements, moderation, or just habit.